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Abstract:
Purpose: Mining industry has always been known for its unsafe working environment. This
industry is one of  the most hazard prone industries. To maintain safety in workplace timely
assessment of  risk associated with different operations performed to extract ore from the ore
body has become necessity. To serve the said purpose, present work demonstrates a robust
hybrid risk assessment approach for mining industry.
Design/Methodology: Accident data from 1995 to 2012 is reviewed to identify hazards
contributed to negative outcomes. The FRA approach is implemented to evaluate the risk levels
associated with identified hazard factors. Thereafter AHP pairwise comparison matrix is
developed to obtain priority weights for the hazard factors. Final priority of  hazards based on
severity of  level of  risk associated with them is obtained considering the outcome of  FRA
approach in terms of  risk score for the hazards, combined with the priority weights obtained
from AHP technique.
Findings: Defuzzified FAHP weight of  hazard factors, this weight gives priority sequence of
hazards to be considered for development of  plan of  mitigation.
Originality/Value: Risk assessment is a requirement of  the Occupational Health and Safety
Act 2000 (Section 7 & 8). The data required to assess the risk is uncertain, and in such case
fuzzy approach is well suited to process the data and get the crisp output. The output of  fuzzy
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approach is made robust with its integration to AHP. In this way FAHP can be used as robust
technique for risk assessment in this industry and this technique develops an efficient safety
management system for the achievement of  goal to develop the workplace with zero accident,
which many other countries have already achieved.
Keywords: risk assessment, hazard, fuzzy, AHP, mining, FAHP, FRA
1. Introduction
Workers in any industry get adversely affected with hazardous working environment. As a
result of this, injuries, fatalities, loss of man hours, loss of work days come into visibility.
Hazard is a source with potential to cause harm. Risk is chance that how likely hazard will give
rise to unacceptable consequences. Risk assessment is a technique which helps mine operators
to identify low, medium, high levels of risk associated with hazards. This will help them to
prioritize the hazards based upon the levels of risk associated with them, so that hazard with
highest potential to cause harm can get mitigate and safe work environment can be developed.
Risk assessment is a requirement of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (section 7 &
8). According to DGMS (Directorate General of Mining Safety) annual report (2012), from 2002
to 2011 in India 620 people were killed and 1070 people got seriously injured in metalliferrous
mines. These figures reveal the fact that efforts can be taken in the area of safety
management for mining industries. Some of the major causes of injuries identified in the
mining sector are fall of roof, fall of sides, rope haulages, winding in shaft, explosives,
electricity, dust/gas etc (DGMS 2010, 2012). The causes mentioned above are the hazards
with potential to cause harm to the human life. Assessment of risk associated with these
hazards will help managers and safety officers to take decision regarding timely mitigation of
the adverse impacts and create a safe work environment which will ultimately help the
organization in the enhancement of productivity. In this paper a integrated approach is
proposed which can be used for the assessment of risk in the mining sector. This approach
comes under the category of Multi criteria decision making (MCDM) method, it refers to
making decision in the presence of multiple and conflicting criteria (Tang, Tzeng & Wang, 2000;
Huang, An & Baker, 2005; Saaty, 1980; Mikhaiov, 2004; An, Huang & Baker, 2007; Venkatrao,
2013; Coyle G., 2004; Vahdani, Mousavi & Tavakkoli-Moghaddam, 2011; Ross, 2010; MATLAB
help). MCDM is used by many researchers in different areas like, supply chain management,
Energy management, chemical engineering, aviation industry, nuclear industry, health and
safety management, drought disasters, fabrication industry (MATLAB help; Ross, 2010; Tang et
al., 2000; Huang et al., 2005; Mikhailov, 2004; An et al., 2007). The approach proposed in this
work is fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP).
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2. Criteria for Risk Evaluation in Mining Industry
The criteria selection for the evaluation of risk levels in mining industry involves detailed study
of accident data for the span of time under consideration. The data for accident gives
information regarding the hazards involved in developing unacceptable consequences. The
evaluation of levels of risk associated with these hazard gives idea about how, to what extent
and with what priority the mitigation plan for the hazards to be prepared and implement. This
gives chance of timely treatment of most risky hazard, which ultimately will prevent any
mishap to happen. From the accident data reviewed for the present work from 1995 to 2011,
hazard factors/sub criteria identified are- Ground movement, winding in shaft, transportation
by machinery, machinery other than transportation, explosives, electricity, dust/gas, falls other
than ground (DGMS 2010, 2012). The above mentioned hazards are evaluated on the basis of
three criteria, consequence of severity, level of exposure, probability of occurrence (Pathak &
Sen, 2001; Paliwal & Jain, 2001; Tripathy & Patra, 1998; Lakshminarayan & Singh, 2000). 
Steps involved for the identification of the criteria is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows the
application of FAHP (proposed approach).
3. FAHP (Proposed Approach)
Figure 1. Criteria identification
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Figure 2. FAHP System
3.1. Fuzzy Reasoning Approach (FRA)
FRA stands for fuzzy reasoning approach. This approach is best suited for those cases where
availability of data is highly uncertain (MATLAB help; Ross, 2010; Tang et al., 2000; Huang et
al., 2005; Mikhailov, 2004; An et al., 2007; An, Chen, & Baker, 2011; Mohammadi & Meech,
2013; Vahdani et al., 2011; Venkatrao, 2013, Buyukozkan & Cifci, 2012a, 2012b; Chen &
Yang, 2011, Khalil, Abdou, Mansour, Farag & Ossman, 2012; Rouhani, Ghazanfari & Jaari,
2012; Wang, Fan & Wang, 2010; Wang & Lee, 2007). Either data is over available or scanty.
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FRA compensates the part of any analysis which needs human perception and expertise to
derive any conclusion based upon the data available. This is done with the help of rule base
which is developed based upon the identified criteria. All the necessary steps required for
evaluation of risk levels associated with identified sub criteria/hazard factors, using fuzzy rule
base reasoning approach consists of following four major components.
3.1.1. Identify Causes/Factors 
In this component all the potential causes which can cause a mishap are identified. This can be
done with the help of accident data maintained by the organization at mine level as well as
central level for all the mines owned by the organization. Annual report generated by
Directorate General of Mining Safety (DGMS) also provides year wise, places wise, cause wise,
accident data for both metalliferrous and non metalliferrous mines.
3.1.2. Identification of fuzzy input and fuzzy output variables
In this component inputs to the FRA system and the expected output from FRA system is
defined. For the present work of assessment of risk levels associated with the identified
hazards, each potential hazard is evaluated on the basis of three criteria namely frequency of
occurrence (FO), consequence of severity (CS), exposure level (E). For the evaluation of risk
level for any hazard, accident data will be input to the FRA system, the system will analyze the
input based on above mentioned criteria. Thereafter the output in term of risk score is
obtained from FRA system. This risk score is then fit into the scale of risk level (RL) to know
the level of risk associated with the hazard.
In FRA the yardsticks for each criterion are developed. These yardsticks are qualitative in
nature. To develop the yardstick it is necessary to assign membership function for each of the
qualitative descriptor of the criteria to understand the degree of membership of the input given
to the system with the space. Similarly yardstick for output expected from the system is
developed. This yardstick will also have detailed description of qualitative descriptor with
assigned membership function (MATLAB help; Ross, 2010; Tang et al., 2000; An et al., 2007;
An et al., 2011).
3.1.3 Construction of fuzzy rule base
The number of rules in the fuzzy rule base depends upon the count of qualitative descriptor
considered for each of the identified criteria (Huang et al., 2005; An et al., 2007; An et al.,
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2011). The if-then rule statements are used to formulate the conditional statement that
comprises fuzzy logic. Any fuzzy rule appears in the following form:
if x is A then y is B
If X and Y is the universe of discourse and its elements are denoted by x and y respectively. A
and B are linguistic variables defined by fuzzy sets on the ranges X and Y, respectively. The if
part of the rule “x is A” is known as ‘antecedent’ and the later part of the rule “y is B” is called
the ‘consequent’. For the present work an example of a rule is
• If Exposure is Low, Frequency of Occurrence is Extremely Infrequent and Consequence
of Severity is Reportable then Risk Level is Low.
The input to an if-then rule for the above example is current value for the input variable-
Exposure, Frequency of Occurrence, Consequence of Severity, these are decided from the
accident database. The output is entire fuzzy set, for the above rule it is Low. This set will be
later defuzzified and crisp output in terms of risk score is obtained (MATLAB help; Ross, 2010;
Mohammadi & Meech, 2013; Chen, Lien, Liu, Liou, Tzeng & Yang, 2011; Dağdeviren, Yavuz &
Kılınç, 2009; Razani, Yazdani-Chamzini & Yakhchali, 2013). If the antecedent is in more than
one part as shown above in present case then fuzzy operators are used. There are two built in
fuzzy operators OR and AND that can be used in such cases. The consequent specifies a fuzzy
set to be assigned to the output. Then the implication of consequent is done. The implication
function modifies that fuzzy set to the degree specified by the antecedent. The implication is
done either by using Min function or Prod function (MATLAB help; Ross, 2010; Mohammadi &
Meech, 2013; Chen et al., 2011; Dağdeviren et al, 2009; Razani et al., 2013).
For the present study there are 30 rules in the rule base. There were 5, 2 & 3 qualitative
descriptor for FO, E & CS consequently, based upon this the total number of rules become (No.
of rules – 5 x 2 x 3). 
Figure 3. Fuzzy Inference System
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The fuzzy inference engine shown in Figure 3, will analyze input given to the system with the
help of rule base developed and fed into the system. Thereafter the output will be given by the
system after Defuzzification in terms of risk score. This score will be fit into the yardstick for
risk levels and finally the level of risk associated with the hazard will be identified. The output
obtained from FRA is lower level out. To get higher level output, the output of FRA is given as
input to the FAHP system. This system will the final higher level output.
3.2. Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP)
FAHP determines weights by conducting pair wise comparison. pair wise comparison of sub
criteria/hazard factors is done considering Saaty’s 9 point scale (An et al., 2007; Mikhailov,
2004; Huang et al., 2005). This scale comprise of triangular fuzzy numbers to indicate
intensity of importance. The scale is given below in Table 1.
Intensity of importance in sub criteria Explanation Triangular Fuzzy Numbers
Equal Importance Two hazard factor contribute equally (1,1,2)
Between equal importance and weak 
importance
When compromise is needed (1,2,3)
Weak importance Experience and judgment slightly favour 
one hazard factor over another
(2,3,4)
Between weak and strong importance When compromise is needed (3,4,5)
Strong importance Experience and judgment strongly favour 
one hazard factor over another
(4,5,6)
Between strong and very strong 
importance
When compromise is needed (5,6,7)
Very strong importance An hazard factor is favoured very strongly 
over another.
(6,7,8)
Between very strong and absolute 
importance
When compromise is needed (7,8,9)
Absolute importance One hazard factor over another is of the 
highest possible affirmation
(8,9,9)
Note: This scale is synthesized based on scheme suggested in (Huang et al., 2005; An et al., 2011; An et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011).
Table 1. FAHP Scale
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Figure 4. Membership function of linguistic variable for comparing two hazard factors/sub-criteria 
The above mentioned scale is used to compare the sub criteria/hazard factors to know their
degree of importance. Figure 4 shows membership function of linguistic variable for comparing
the sub-criteria/hazard factors. Thereafter the FAHP matrix is prepared.
Suppose there are two hazard factors/sub-criteria to be compared namely fall of roof and
electricity. If fall of roof is absolutely important as compared to electricity, because once roof
falls in underground mines number of people get affect and cases of electricity prone accidents
are found less then based upon importance fall of roof will be assigned with fuzzy number
(9,9,9) and electricity will have fuzzy number (1/9,1/9,1/9).
3.2.1 Calculation of fuzzy weights and defuzzified weights
To calculate fuzzy weights, arithmetic operations are performed on the fuzzy numbers.
Triangular fuzzy number is a number with three points. For example ña (tla tma tua) can be
interpreted as-
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Where tl a and tua stands for lower and upper bound of fuzzy number ñ a, respectively, and tma is
the modal value. The fuzzy number can be denoted as ña (tla tma tua). Below explained are the
arithmetic operations performed on the two fuzzy numbers ña (tla tma tua) and ñb(tlb tmb tub).
Membership function of triangular fuzzy number is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Membership Function of Triangular Fuzzy Number
The arithmetic operations that are performed on the two fuzzy numbers {ña (tla tma tua) & ñb(tlb
tmb tub)} are defined as follows (Ros, 2010;, An et al., 2011).
• Addition of a fuzzy number ⊕
ña ⊕ ñb = (tla+ tlb, tma+ tmb, tua + tub) (1)
• Multiplication of a fuzzy number ⊗
ña ⊗ ñb = (tlaX tlb, tma X tmb, tua X tub) (2)
• Division of a fuzzy number ∅
ña ∅ ñb = (tla / tub, tma / tmb, tua / tlb) (3)
• Subtraction of a fuzzy number
ña ϴ ñb = (tla - tub, tma - tmb, tua – tlb) (4)
• Reciprocal of a fuzzy number
ñ a-1 = (tla tma tua)-1 = (1/ tla, 1/ tma, 1/ tua) (5)
Where ⊕, ⊗, ∅, ϴ stands for fuzzy logic addition, multiplication, division and subtraction
operation respectively.
Fuzzy weights can be calculated by using geometric mean technique (Tang et al., 2000; Huang
et al., 2005; Mikhailov, 2004; An et al., 2007; Saaty, 1980; Mohammadi & Meech, 2013; Liu,
Yang, Wang, Sii, 2004).
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ƒ̃ = (ñi,1 ⊗ ñi,2 ⊗ ... ñi,n)1/n
= ((tli,1 x tli,2 x tli,3 … x tli,n)1/n,
(tmi,1 x tmi,2 x tmi,3 … x tmi,n)1/n,
(tui,1 x tui,2 x tui,3 … x tui,n)1/n)
(6)
(7)
ƒ̃i = geometric mean of the ith row.
w̃i = fuzzy weight of the ith event.
As soon as we get fuzzified weights of all the hazard factors, defuzzification of the weights is
done, as the fuzzified weights are triangular fuzzy numbers and expected output is crisp in
nature. The fuzzified weight obtained by geometric mean method is w̃ i(tl i , tmi , tui), now, the
defuzzified mean value of weight is calculated by (Tang et al., 2000; An et al., 2007; An et al.,
2011; Mohammadi & Meech, 2013).
(8)
Then wi is calculated as
(9)
Overall risk at mine level can be calculated by the formula
RLoverall = ∑ RLi wi (10)
Where, Ri is the risk score calculated from FRA system. To calculate overall risk level associated
with the mine, Ri for every identified hazard that caused mishap is calculated with the help of
FRA system and then Ri for the hazard is multiplied with w̃i of that particular hazard obtained
from FAHP system and after summation of all these combined results of FRA and FAHP overall
risk at mine level is obtained.
4. Application of proposed approach
For the present work the proposed integrated approach is used to evaluate levels of risk
associated with hazards identified in metalliferrous mines. The mine selected for study extracts
manganese and this mine is owned by central government undertaking organization, the mine
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is located in Maharashtra (India). The hazard factors were identified with the help of DGMS
annual report (DGMS 2010, 2012) and for corresponding hazard factors accident data with
consequence of severity, exposure level and frequency of occurrence from year 1995 to 2011
was gathered from the organization. With the analysis of accident data, the hazard
factors/sub-criteria are identified as follows.
• Ground Movement
• Winding in shaft
• Transportation by machinery
• Machinery other than transportation
• Explosives,
• Electricity, 
• Dust/gas, 
• Falls other than ground
These hazard factors are evaluated to get an idea about the risk levels associated with them
with the application of integrated approach. Thereafter overall mine level risk is evaluated so
that the process of risk assessment can be adopted systematically and can help the safety
managers to make effective mitigation plan on time which will ultimately lead to safe working
environment.
4.1. Application of FRA
For the application of FRA approach Fuzzy Logic tool box of MATLAB is used. To build the Fuzzy
Inference System in MATLAB for the case under study, fuzzy inputs were decided. Thereafter
fuzzy operator is designated for antecedents of given rule if there is more then one part in
antecedent in any rule. Two operators either AND or OR can be used for this purpose. Then
implication method is applied before which the rule weight is decided. The weight of rule is
between 0 to 1, this weight is decided based upon the number given by the antecedent. The
input for implication is the number provided by the antecedent and output of implication is a
fuzzy set. After this output is aggregated. Aggregation is the process by which the fuzzy sets
that represents the out puts of each rule are combined into a single fuzzy set. Then this fuzzy
set is defuzzified and crisp output is obtained. 
For the present case study a system named ‘risk_assesment’ is created, the type of system is
‘mamdani’ as it is most commonly seen fuzzy methodology and it is among first control
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systems built using fuzzy set theory (MATLAB help; Ros, 2010; Venkatrao, 2013). Number of
inputs are 3 and output is 1. Number of rules based on qualitative descriptor are 30. For
implication ‘min’ built-in-method is used and for defuzzification of the fuzzy set ‘centroid’ built-
in-method is used.
The yardstick for the criteria and output along with membership function assigned to
qualitative descriptor is given below in Table 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Verma & Gupta, 2013) and Table 6
shows the rule base with rule antecedent, rule consequent, rule weight and connection,
developed for fuzzy inference engine.
Qualitative Descriptor Description Parameters of MFs
Extremely Infrequent 5-10 Years 1.5, 0 (gaussian)
Infrequent 2-5 years 1.5, 3.5 (gaussian)
Rather Frequent 1-2 Years 4, 5.5 (gaussian)
Frequent 1 year 6, 7.5 (gaussian)
Very Frequent Accident/month 8, 10 (gaussian)
Table 2. Frequency of Occurrence/Probability of Accidents (FO)
Qualitative Descriptor Description Parameters Of Mfs
Reportable Minor Injury 1.5, 0 (gaussian)
Serious Major Injury 1.5, 5 (gaussian)
Fatal Death 5, 10 (gaussian))
Table 3. Consequence of Severity (CS)
Qualitative Descriptor Description Parameters Of Mfs
Low Level One Person getting exposed to the hazard 0,0,1,3 (trapezoid)
High Level More than one person getting exposed to the hazard 7,9,10,10 (trapezoid)
Table 4. Exposure Level (E)
Qualitative Descriptor Description Risk Parameters of Mfs
High Risk must be reduced safe in
exceptional circumstances.
200 <= risk score <= 500 300, 400, 500
(triangular)
Medium Risk must be reduced if it is
reasonably practicable to do so.
20 <= risk score <= 200 150, 200, 300
(triangular)
Low Risk is acceptable 20 > risk score 0, 50, 100
(triangular)
Table 5. Risk Level (RL)
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Rule Antecedent Rule Consequent Rule Weight Rule Connection
1 1 1 1 (1) 1
1 1 2 2 (1) 1
1 1 1 3 (1) 1
1 2 1 1 (1) 1
1 2 2 2 (1) 1
1 2 3 3 (1) 1
1 3 1 1 (1) 1
1 3 2 2 (1) 1
1 3 3 3 (1) 1
1 4 1 1 (1) 1
1 4 2 3 (1) 1
1 4 3 3 (1) 1
1 5 1 3 (1) 1
1 5 2 3 (1) 1
1 5 3 3 (1) 1
2 1 1 1 (1) 1
2 1 2 2 (1) 1
2 1 3 3 (1) 1
2 2 1 1 (1) 1
2 2 2 3 (1) 1
2 2 3 3 (1) 1
2 3 1 2 (1) 1
2 3 2 3 (1) 1
2 3 3 3 (1) 1
2 4 1 3 (1) 1
2 4 2 3 (1) 1
2 4 3 3 (1) 1
2 5 1 3 (1) 1
2 5 2 3 (1) 1
2 5 3 3 (1) 1
Table 6. Rule base
The accident data is evaluated based on the above mentioned three criteria using fuzzy logic
tool box of Matlab software and the output which is the risk score for the hazard factor is
obtained. The risk scores for all the hazard factors are given below in the Table 7:
Hazard Factor Risk Score(RLi) Risk Level Membership Functions (Mfs)
Ground Movement 321.75 High Level Risk 300,400,500 (triangular)
Winding in Shaft 286.76 Medium Level Risk 150,200,300 (triangular)
Transportation by Machinery 286.76 Medium Level Risk 150,200,300 (triangular)
Machinery other than transportation 50 Low Level Risk 0,50,100 (triangular)
Explosives 50 Low Level Risk 0,50,100 (triangular)
Electricity 286.76 Medium Level Risk 150,200,300 (triangular)
Dust/Gas 41.5 Low Level Risk 0,50,100 (triangular)
Falls other than grounds 321.37 High Level Risk 300,400,500 (triangular)
Table 7. Risk Level of Hazards obtained from FRA
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The output of the above described approach is risk score which is fit in the yardstick of risk
level to know the level of risk associated with the hazard. As shown above the risk score for
ground movement is 321.75, this score fits within the range specified for the qualitative
descriptor i.e. high level risk in the yardstick for risk level. Similarly remaining for all the
hazard factors risk scores are interpreted.
The output of FRA approach as discussed is low level output and contains uncertainty, to filter
out the uncertainty and to get crisp output; the output of FRA is taken as input for FAHP
approach.
4.2. Application of FAHP approach
FAHP analysis starts with the development of pair wise comparison matrix. For the present
study the pair wise comparison matrix is for hazard factor is developed, which is shown below
in Table 8:
Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1, 1, 1 8, 9, 9 6, 7, 8 8, 9, 9 8, 9, 9 8, 9, 9 5, 6, 7 5, 6, 7
2 0.11, 0.11,
0.13
1, 1, 1 1, 0.5, 0.33 1, 2, 2 3, 4, 5 3, 4, 5 0.13, 0.11,
0.11
0.13, 0.11,
0.11
3 0.13, 0.14,
0.17
3, 2, 1 1, 1, 1 4, 5, 6 5, 6, 7 5, 6, 7 0.13, 0.11,
0.11
0.13, 0.11,
0.11
4 0.11, 0.11,
0.13
0.5, 1, 1 0.17, 0.2,
0.25
1,1,1 4, 5, 6 4, 5, 6 0.13, 0.11,
0.11
0.13, 0.11,
0.11
5 0.11, 0.11,
0.13
0.2, 0.25,
0.33
0.17,0.2,0.
25
0.17, 0.2,
0.25
1, 1, 1 1, 1, 2 0.13, 0.11,
0.11
0.13, 0.11,
0.11
6 0.11, 0.11,
0.13
0.2, 0.25,
0.33
0.17,0.2,
0.25
0.17, 0.2,
0.25
0.5, 1, 1 1, 1, 1 0.13, 0.11,
0.11
0.13, 0.11,
0.11
7 0.14, 0.17,
0.2
9, 9, 8 0.11, 0.11,
0.13
9, 9, 8 9, 9, 8 9, 9, 8 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 2
8 0.14, 0.17,
0.2
9, 9, 8 0.11, 0.11,
0.13
9, 9, 8 9, 9, 8 9, 9, 8 2, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
Table 8. Pair wise comparison matrix 
Where,
1 = Ground movement
2 = Winding in shaft
3 = Transportation by machinery
4 = Machinery other than transportation
5 = Explosives
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6 = Electricity
7 = Dust/Gas
8 = Falls other than ground
4.2.1. Assessment of priority weights for the hazard factors/sub-criteria
FAHP analysis starts with calculation of weight associated with hazards on the basis of Equation
6 and 7. On the basis of these equations the geometric mean technique gives the fuzzy weight
of the hazards factors.
Step 1. Calculation of fuzzy weights
ƒ̃ = (ñi,1 ⊗ ñi,2 ⊗ ... ñi,n)1/n
= ((tli,1 x tli,2 x tli,3 … x tli,n)1/n,
(tmi,1 x tmi,2 x tmi,3 … x tmi,n)1/n,
(tui,1 x tui,2 x tui,3 … x tui,n)1/n)
Ƒ̃1 = [(1 x 8 x 6 x 8 x 8 x 8 x 5 x 5)1/8, (1 x 9 x 7 x 9 x 9 x 9 x 6 x 6)1/8, (1 x 9 x 8 x 9 x 9 x 9 x 7 x 7)1/8]
ƒ̃1 = (5.29, 5.98, 6.32)
Similarly, Table 9 shows geometric mean (ƒ̃i) value for all hazard factors.
ƒ̃1 = (5.29, 5.98, 6.32) ƒ̃5 = (0.23, 0.24, 0.29)
ƒ̃2 = (0.60, 0.60, 0.63) ƒ̃6 = (0. 21, 0.24, 0.27)
ƒ̃3 = (0.94, 0.94, 0.93) ƒ̃7 = (1.78, 1.8, 1.95)
ƒ̃4 = (0.47, 0.53, 0.58) ƒ̃8 = (1.94, 1.82, 1.79) 
Table 9. value of geometric mean (ƒ̃i) for all hazard factors
Similarly, Table 10 shows the value of fuzzy weights (w̃i) for all hazard factors.
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w̃1 = (0.41, 0.47, 0.55) w̃5 = (0.01, 0.01, 0.02)
w̃2 = (0.04, 0.05, 0.05) w̃6 = (0.01, 0.01, 0.02)
w̃3 = (0.07, 0.07, 0.08) w̃7 = (0.13, 0.14, 0.17)
w̃4 = (0.03, 0.04, 0.05) w̃8 = (0.15, 0.15, 0.16)
Table 10. value of fuzzy weights (w̃i) of hazard factors
Step 2. Defuzzification of the weights
Fuzzy priority weights calculated above are defuzzified to get crisp weights using Equation 8.
DF w̃i = defuzzified mean value of weight
w̃1 = (0.41, 0.47, 0.55)
DF w̃1 = 0.058
Similarly, Table 11 shows defuzzified mean value of weights of all the hazard factors/sub-
criteria.
DF w̃1 = 0.058 DF w̃5 = 0.003
DF w̃2 = 0.006 DF w̃6 = 0.006
DF w̃3 = 0.003 DF w̃7 = 0.015
DF w̃4 = 0.009 DF w̃8 = 0.003
Table 11. defuzzified mean value of weights of hazard factors/sub-criteria
Step 3. Normalization of defuzzied weights
Normalization of the defuzzified weights is done using Equation 9.
Where,
∑ DF w̃i = 0.103
Now,
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w1 = 0.56
Similarly, Table 12 shows normalized defuzzified weights of all the hazard factors/sub-criteria.
w1 = 0.56 w5 = 0.02
w2 = 0.05 w6 = 0.05
w3 = 0.02 w7 = 0.145 
w4 = 0.08 w8 = 0.02
Table 12. normalized defuzzified weights of hazard factors/sub-criteria
Step 4. Overall risk estimation
Overall risk estimation at mine level can be calculated using Equation 10.
RLoverall = ∑ RLi w
RL1 = w1 x FRA risk score for hazard 1
  = 0.56 x 321.75                      
RL1 = 180.18
Similarly, Table 13 shows the FRA risk score of all the hazard factors.
RL1 = 180.18 RL5 = 1
RL2 = 2.5 RL6 = 2.5
RL3 = 5.73 RL7 = 41.5
RL4 = 22.94 RL8 = 6.42
Table 13. FRA risk score of hazard factors/sub-criteria
From the RL values calculated above the hazard with maximum risk associated can be
identified and accordingly based on priority basis mitigation plan to treat the hazard can be
prepared. In the present case looking at the RLs, the priority ranking of hazard is-
RL1 > RL7> RL4 > RL8> RL3> RL2> RL6> RL5
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or
RL1 > RL7> RL4 > RL8> RL3> RL6> RL2> RL5
Using the Equation 10 overall risk in any of the mining site can be calculated as 
RLoverall = ∑RLi
RLoverall = 262.77
The above shown risk score is fit in the yardstick of risk level and it is observed that the level
of risk associated at mine level is medium.
4.2.2. Results and discussions
Ri ƒ̃i w̃i DF w̃i wi RLi wi
321.75 ƒ̃1 = (5.29, 5.98,6.32) w̃1 = (0.41, 0.47, 0.55) DF w̃1 = 0.058 w1 = 0.56 RL1 = 180.18
286.76 ƒ̃2 = (0.60,0.60,0.63) w̃2 = (0.04, 0.05, 0.05) DF w̃2 = 0.006 w2 = 0.05 RL2 = 2.5
286.76 ƒ̃3 = (0.94,0.94,0.93) w̃3 = (0.07, 0.07, 0.08) DF w̃3 = 0.003 w3 = 0.02 RL3 = 5.73
50 ƒ̃4 = (0.47,0.53,0.58) w̃4 = (0.03, 0.04, 0.05) DF w̃4 = 0.009 w4 = 0.08 RL4 = 22.94
50 ƒ̃5 = (0.23,0.24,0.29) w̃5 = (0.01, 0.01, 0.02) DF w̃5 = 0.003 w5 = 0.02 RL5 = 1
286.76 ƒ̃6= (0. 21,0.24,0.27) w̃6=(0.01,0.01, 0.02) DF w̃6 = 0.006 w6 = 0.05 RL6 = 2.5
286.76 ƒ̃7 = (1.78, 1.8, 1.95) w̃7 = (0.13, 0.14, 0.17) DF w̃7 = 0.015 w7 = 0.145 RL7 = 41.5
321.37 ƒ̃8 = (1.94, 1.82,1.79) w̃8 = (0.15, 0.15, 0.16) DF w̃8 = 0.003 w8 = 0.02 RL8 = 6.42
Table 14. Final Results of FAHP approach
Table 14 shows the result obtained from the application of FAHP approach. The overall RL
obtained is 262.77. This score is fit in the yardstick of risk level to conclude that the risk
associated at mine level for all the operations performed to extract ore from ore body is
medium. The summary of analysis indicates the risk level associated with individual hazard,
like the output obtained from FRA shown above in terms of R i gives preliminary idea that
maximum risk is associated with hazard ground movement with maximum risk score of 321.75
followed by the hazard falls other than ground with risk score of 321.37. After combining the
results of FRA with AHP, the final conclusion about the risk levels of hazard are drawn, the
most risky hazard having maximum potential to create unacceptable consequences is ground
movement with RL = 180.18 followed by dust hazard with RL =41.5, similarly conclusions can
be drawn about every identified hazard based upon RL obtained from FAHP. After getting
priority risk scores for the hazards, the mitigation plan for the hazard is prepared accordingly
so that precautionary actions can be taken for most risky hazard on priority basis and
workplace safety can be improved. 
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5. Conclusion
This paper proposed a novel approach which is integration of FRA and AHP approaches for
evaluation of risk levels associated with identified hazard factors in mining industry. The
traditional approach adopted for risk assessment in the mining industry relies upon availability
and accuracy of data. Traditional technique is not sufficient enough to deal with uncertain data.
To deal with such problem, proposed approach can be adopted. FRA approach can efficiently
manage uncertain input data for the system and to get crisp and robust output from the
system without any uncertainty, the output obtained from FRA approach is combined with AHP
technique. The proposed model gives output in terms of RLs associated with hazard factors
identified and finally after combining the risk scores of all the hazard factors the overall risk
associated with the mining site is obtained. The proposed model can be adopted for systematic
assessment of risk in the said industry as risk assessment is a requirement of the Occupational
Health and Safety Act 2000 (section 7 & 8). The advantages of the proposed risk assessment
model can be summarized as: (1) it can handle expert knowledge, engineering judgments. (2)
it is efficient enough to deal with uncertain and imprecise data (3) as the approach is
integrated and hybridized the uncertainty in output gets filtered and robust final output is
obtained (4) as the approach is systematic and structured it is not required to start always
from scratch, any hazard factor can be analyzed based upon mentioned criteria. This approach
will help decision makers, risk analyst, safety managers to make plan for mitigation of the
risky hazards and develop safe work environment.
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